March 2000 (13,000 words)

Elie Podeh is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Islam and Middle Eastern Studies, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Research Fellow of the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace.

Forging the nation's collective memory is an integral part of the process of nation building. The powerful link between history and memory is especially salient in the educational system, which is responsible for implanting knowledge and values in the younger generation. The successful completion of this task, it is assumed, will turn young people into loyal citizens and will help instill a shared identity.

Interestingly enough, historians and sociologists generally fail to note the political and social links between school textbooks and collective memory. Scholars dealing with the tools used by the state to create its own collective memory -- such as historiography, literature, cinema or national commemorations -- tend to overlook the role played by textbooks. At the same time, scholars in the field of textbook research barely analyze them in the context of the attempts to build a collective memory, usually ignoring the social environment that helps shape textbook content as well.(1)

Since in many Western democracies, and certainly in nondemocratic societies, the state controls the educational apparatus, it can shape the nation's collective memory by determining what is to be included and what excluded from the curricula and from textbooks. Such a course of action opens the way for the manipulation of the past in order to mold the present and the future.(2)

In this respect, the school system, and textbooks, become yet another arm of the state, agents of memory whose aim is to ensure the transmission of certain "approved knowledge" to the younger generation. Textbooks thus function as a sort of "supreme historical court" whose task is to decipher "from all the accumulated `pieces of the past' the `true' collective memories which are appropriate for inclusion in the canonical national historical narrative."(3) In constructing the collective memory, textbooks play a dual role: on the one hand, they provide a sense of continuity between the past and the present, transmitting accepted historical narratives; on the other, they alter -- or rewrite -- the past in order to suit contemporary needs.(4)

The manipulation of the past often entails the use of stereotypes and prejudice in describing the "other."(5) Carried to the extreme, stereotyping and prejudice foster delegitimization -- the "categorization of groups into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values."(6) Common means used for delegitimization, according to Daniel Bar-Tal, are dehumanization, outcasting, trait characterization, use of political labels, and group comparison.(7)

It is common knowledge that textbooks in social sciences and humanities do not merely convey an objective body of information. Textbooks, according to Mehlinger, are the modern version of village storytellers, since they "are responsible for conveying to youth what adults believe they should know about their own culture as well as that of other societies."

In his opinion, none of the socialization instruments can be compared to textbooks "in their capacity to convey a uniform, approved, even official version of what youth should believe."(8) According to Michael Apple, though textbooks pretend to teach neutral, legitimate knowledge, they are often used as ideological tools to promote a certain belief system and legitimize an established political and social order. In other words, the selection and organization of knowledge for schools is an ideological process that serves the interests of particular classes and social groups.(9)

It is difficult to establish the exact role played by textbooks in comparison to other socialization instruments. The growing exposure of the younger generation to the electronic media has undoubtedly diminished the centrality of the textbook as an instrument of education. Still, most scholars tend to agree that textbooks have remained crucial.

In his analysis of European history textbooks in the last hundred years, Wolfgang Jacobmeyer came to the conclusion that "our modern societies have developed history textbooks as the most remarkable medium for the transmission of history, outnumbering press, radio, and TV."(10) Philip Altbach, too, observed that "in an age of computers and satellite communications, the most powerful and pervasive educational technology is the textbook."(11) A recent study found that although some 85 percent of the students' knowledge came from outside the school and from sources other than their teachers, "dependence on textbooks in some form or other was likely to remain an important element in the learning of history, geography and social studies."(12)

Another major problem inherent in the study of textbooks is that although they constitute the core of the school curriculum, it cannot be assumed that what is included in the text is actually taught or learned. According to Apple, students respond to the text in three different ways: in the first, dominant way, the student accepts the messages contained in the text at face value.

In the second, negotiated way, the reader may dispute a certain claim but accept the overall interpretation of the text. In the third, oppositional way, the student rejects the dominant interpretation of the text.(13) While these observations are illuminating, it may be assumed that most students lack sufficient historical knowledge to prompt them to contest existing narratives. It is likely, therefore, that most students, especially in nondemocratic societies, belong to the dominant or negotiated categories.

Furthermore, textbooks carry the authority of print. Written texts, according to David Olson, "are devices which separate speech from speaker, and that separation in itself makes the words impersonal, objective and above criticism." In his opinion, textbooks resemble religious rituals since both "are devices for putting ideas and beliefs above criticism."(14) When the message originates in the textbook, which teachers and parents themselves consult, students attach greater authority to them. Moreover, since textbooks often constitute the ultimate reference source for the student (as well as for the teacher, in certain cases), it is likely that beliefs implanted through them will "persist for a lifetime."(15) A recent study found that when pressed, students chose the textbook as the most accurate of reference sources because "its apparent objective, encyclopedic nature fit more readily with their view of history and because many of their classroom activities involved searching for facts."(16)

The role ascribed to the textbook of legitimizing an established political and social order is particularly relevant to textbooks in the field of history. Since each generation makes a considerable effort to transmit its traditions and belief system to the next generation, history textbooks have traditionally been "geared to the teaching of the national past and to generating an identification with it."(17) Ever since the rise of the nation-state in Europe in the nineteenth century, history textbooks were used by states as instruments for glorifying the nation, consolidating its national identity, and justifying particular forms of social and political systems.(18) Many studies in the West have demonstrated that ethnocentric views and myths, stereotypes and prejudices often pervade history textbooks.(19)

The case of Israel is no exception. The Israeli educational system and its textbooks, side by side with such factors as Zionist historiography, children's books and the media, have functioned as "memory agents," helping to mold the nation's collective memory.(20) This article focuses on a central aspect of this process: how the Arab-Israeli conflict has been portrayed over the last fifty years by the Israeli educational system in general, and in its history textbooks in particular.(21)

Studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict have usually concentrated on its historical, political, military and economic dimensions, ignoring the equally important cultural and psychological aspects of the conflict as reflected in the attitudes and behavior of the participants. Since human behavior is shaped not only by reality but by the perception of it, it is highly likely that perceptions (whether genuine or false) of this conflict affect the future course of events. As in other international conflicts, these perceptions are often expressed in ethnocentric terms.

A sharp distinction is made between the "we" (Israelis) and the "they" (Arabs), a division that is essential for maintaining a distinct Jewish-Israeli identity and for sustaining the ability to compete successfully with the Arabs.(22) Ethnocentric views are largely responsible for the formation of different, if not dichotomous, historical narratives by the parties to the conflict; many Israelis and Arabs (including the Palestinians) perceive their version of history to be "true" and "objective," while the other side's is considered "incorrect" or "distorted." These antagonistic narratives have often been accompanied by the use of stereotypes, prejudices and misconceptions regarding the enemy.(23) Such narratives are transmitted to the next generation, inter alia, through school textbooks.

Previous studies of Israeli textbooks have indeed revealed the existence of such biases, prejudices and omissions in the description of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These analyses were important because they exposed the often negative and stereotypical way in which the Israeli educational system presented the other -- the Arab.(24)

Since then, many new history textbooks have appeared, which enable us to place the older textbooks in a better perspective. Moreover, previous studies tended to be narrow, concentrating on the factual distortions in the text while ignoring the important link between text and historical context. This article seeks to present a wider focus on the basis of two major assumptions: first, since textbooks are not compiled in a vacuum and their contents reflect trends in society and culture, the texts can be assessed only within the framework of' their historical context; second, only a comparative analysis of textbooks over a period of time can reveal trends of both continuity and change in historical narrative.

In addition, three interrelated issues come into play in assessing the content of a textbook and gauging its importance:

(1) the attitudes of historians and education officials toward the role and function of textbooks;
(2) the relation between the spirit of the time (zeitgeist) and the content of the textbook; and
(3) the impact of historiography on textbooks.

Taking into account these three factors, I have identified three successive generations of Israeli history textbooks since 1948. The first generation refers to textbooks used in the educational system until the mid-1970s. Some of these had been in use since the 1940s, if not before, in earlier editions. Characterized by a low level of typography, the absence of proto-text (except for occasional maps), and dense narrative tainted by emotional writing, most of these textbooks were written by teachers or officials in the Ministry of Education.

The second generation refers to textbooks published daring 1975-1992, in accordance with new curricula introduced in the mid-1970s.

These textbooks were written and published by the Ministry of Education, with the exception of some privately written high school textbooks, some of which were not authorized for use by the ministry yet became highly popular in schools. Outwardly more appealing, the textbooks of the second generation included pictures, maps, charts and diagrams, were written in a less passionate style and followed new, more progressive methodological premises.

The third generation refers to textbooks published since the mid-1990s, in accordance with the new history curricula. Written privately or by university-affiliated bodies, these textbooks were usually approved by the Ministry of Education. Although it is too early to make a final judgment on these recent changes, it would appear that the new curricula and history textbooks address many of the problems that typified the first- and second-generation textbooks. Interestingly, one new textbook for junior high was bold enough to inform the students that one goal of the educational system was to "set curricula aimed at imbuing Israeli citizens with a love of the fatherland and enhancing their faith in the just cause of the State."(25)

TEXTBOOKS AND THE PERCEPTION OF HISTORY

A state educational system constitutes a major instrument for socializing young people to society's dominant values.(26) Although all nation-states have laid great emphasis on teaching their national history, with the aim of consolidating the bond between citizen and homeland, the content of history textbooks, as well as the methods employed to convey it to the students, was often the outcome of a struggle between two opposing schools of thought: the academic approach, which stressed the importance of objectivity (or at least the absence of tendentiousness), similar to that ostensibly found in academic research; and the national school, which viewed the teaching of history as a legitimate tool of the state for implanting national values, even at the price of the selective use of historical evidence. At times, attempts to combine these two conflicting approaches resulted in the emergence of a third, synthetic approach.(27)

The Israeli educational system has been dominated by the national school for most of the period under review. In the early period of the state, its most notable representative was Mihael Ziv, head of the Department for High School Education in the Ministry of Education during the 1950s and author of several history textbooks and atlases. Evidently, Ziv's ideas and textbooks remained influential at least until the late 1980s. Ziv did not believe that teaching history was a detached or impersonal occupation. History, he declared, should "aspire to instill in the young specific values, direct them toward a particular point of view and encourage them to adopt proper attitudes approved by society."

He further maintained that each generation had its particular "historical truth" that must be passed along ,to the next generation.(28) While a history teacher must teach those facts that are "to the best of his knowledge and belief, true," he must stress historic moral and educational goals -- an aspect of history, Ziv lamented, that academic historians were inclined to scorn or neglect:

Professional historians often overlook history's key role in the educational process. They ignore its special social function. They disregard the school's duty to instill beliefs and opinions in the students. They believe that the school's function, when teaching history, is simply to acquaint the students with the facts. Yet, we would be failing in our duty if were we to restrict ourselves to offering our students dry, arid, academic analyses of the past. History should not be taught as though viewed from Olympian heights. We should not teach a history that lies beyond good or evil, beyond time and place, which aims at nothing more than pure intellectual satisfaction. On the contrary, history must serve to inculcate in the student a strong sense of responsibility for the future. It must foster a belief in the importance of social activism. Our goal is not to create historians but mold citizens who will, one day, themselves make and shape history.(29)

In Ziv's view, the history teacher must be careful about the way he presents the material in the classroom. Without ignoring faults, failures or mistakes, he must, nevertheless, use prudence. This, he claimed, was essential in view of the extreme sensitivity of the young in general, and Israeli youth in particular, and their propensity for hasty judgements. Israeli youth, he concluded, are not always capable of "getting to the complex root of the matter, or of understanding the tangled web of the `unique circumstances' that formed Jewish history."(30) Moreover, he argued, to achieve the ideal synthesis between history and pedagogy, "the values underlying the official historical narrative, as introduced in the classroom, must accord with society's principal values."

No society, he emphasized, "can afford a contradiction between these two value systems." Accordingly, the material chosen was geared to "instill love and respect for our most important and cherished values, and encourage the young to identify utterly with society's goals, fight for its continued existence and play an active role in its development and progress."(31)

The academic school of thought represented the other extreme. For most of the period under discussion, this outlook was marginal in the educational system. Its most outspoken representative was the philosopher of education Zvi Adar of the Hebrew University. While Adar did not object to devoting a major part of the history syllabus to the nation's history, he warned against teaching history by using the country's "present needs as the point of departure." He stressed that "to interpret the past in the light of [present] needs may result in an unfortunate distortion of that very same past." Highly critical of nationalistic-minded teachers and historians who "mythicized history [and] idolized its protagonists, transforming them into godlike heroes," he argued that they tended to "pervert the history of people at odds or in conflict with the [Israeli] nation."

A nationalistic-inspired educational system, he held, "served merely to acerbate and deepen hatred among nations." Such teaching, he admonished, was little more than "warmongering." It served to reinforce and pass on prejudices toward other nations, thus creating a web of reciprocal hatred, suspicion and fear. It constituted "bad humanist education." In Adar's opinion, students should not be taught to revere the nation's history uncritically or worship its heroes blindly. Events and people, he claimed, must be judged fairly and honestly, for better and for worse. Rather than offer convoluted apologies, as was often the case, Adar advocated that history teachers acknowledge shameful or regrettable episodes in the nation's history, modeling themselves on those historians "who steadfastly seek the truth and are careful not to color the past with their own prejudices."(32)

The third school of thought aspired to the golden mean, seeking to create a synthesis between the national and academic approaches. Its principal representatives in the early period of the state were Mihael Hendel and Y. Paporish. Hendel, author of several history textbooks, acknowledged that students "must be taught that our very existence is rooted in our national history and that our present can only be understood in light of our past."

This did not mean, however, that young people must be presented with an idealized, "whitewashed" version of the past. The nation's youth, he insisted, "must be equally cognizant of the shadows that darken the nation's history. They should be informed of all events and incidents, good and bad, that together form their nation's history. Furthermore, they must be taught to understand these in historical terms and judge them in their historical context."(33) Paporish, author of many geography textbooks, held similar views:

When teaching history, we will not abandon our national and social goals. Nor will we turn history into a "neutral" discipline, synonymous with the sciences. Yet at the same time we must be careful not to limit ourselves to presenting a single, restricted, partisan view of history. History lessons that do nothing but produce a generation of fanatics, who will use any and all means to achieve their narrow political goals, who have no sympathy toward or understanding of their neighbors, and who are woefully ignorant of others' equally valid or meaningful ideas, are extremely dangerous. To teach such history is to fail. More than that, it is to fail humankind. History should not be exploited merely to promote narrow national and social goals, but should advance universal humanist values that will guide and enlighten the student.(34)

An examination of the history curriculum and textbooks used by the educational system until 1967 reveals that it was dominated by the national school, while the impact of the other two schools of thought was marginal. The national approach was still dominant during the 1970s and 1980s, but the synthetic approach made inroads, gradually eroding the preponderance of the national school.(35) The most visible and decisive change, however, occurred in the 1990s, with the publication of a number of textbooks that were clearly inspired and guided by the academic school of thought. Still, the national school of thought did not disappear.

ZEITGEIST AND SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS

The Israeli educational system passed through three stages which I have called childhood (until 1967); adolescence (1967-1984); and adulthood (1984 onwards). This periodization only roughly corresponds to the appearance of the three generations of textbooks (see above, pp. 69-70). The difference between these two periodizations stems from the fact that changes in society usually predate the introduction of changes in textbooks.

The Early Phase: "Childhood" (1948-1967)

This period began, in fact, under the British Mandate (1920-1948) or possibly even earlier, under the Ottoman Empire, when the foundations of the Hebrew educational system were first laid down. It ended with the 1967 Six-Day War. Curiously, the educational system failed to develop a defined position on the "Arab question" (later known as the Arab-Israeli conflict) during this entire period. On the rare occasions when the subject was discussed, it was not treated in a systematic manner. This anomaly accurately reflected the ambiguity that characterized the attitude of the Jewish community toward its Arab neighbors at the time.

Throughout this period the educational system focused upon instilling Zionist values in its students. Classes in Zionist history and ideology, local geography (moledet), biblical studies and even literature were all designed to serve this end. Teachers' conferences and symposia emphasized the centrality of Zionist values. Arab history, culture and language, by contrast, were almost completely ignored. As late as spring 1967, when the teachers' union held a conference on the subject of "Teaching Values" with 1,200 participants, not a single Arab teacher was in attendance and the question of Arab-Jewish relations was absent from the agenda.(36)

The educational system's failure to address the Arab problem stemmed from two factors. First, the Arabs had not been given a place in the newly created collective memory of the Jewish (Israeli) nation. The challenge of coalescing a collective memory for a nation composed of numerous immigrant groups, each with its own background and history, was difficult enough without complicating matters further by inserting the Israeli Arabs.

Moreover, including, or even referring to, the Arab or Palestinian people evoked a fear of undermining the legitimacy of the Zionist enterprise. Hence, Arabs, and particularly Palestinian Arabs, were absent from the early versions of the nation's collective memory.(37) Second, menacing military and political events during 1948-1967 heightened a sense of isolation and produced a siege mentality within Israeli society.(38) The widespread fear at the time was that the next round of war would result in the destruction of the State of Israel. Speeches and published material of the period clearly reveal the saliency of these convictions.

Textbooks written during this period reflected the need to construct a single, uniform national historical narrative. Consequently, despite the fact that until 1953 -- the year the National Education Law was enacted -- the educational system was divided into three streams (the labor trend, the national-religious trend and the general-secular trend), all schools dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict in much the same way. According to historian Anita Shapira, schools and youth movements made very little effort "to impart a knowledge about Arabs to the pupils or familiarize them with Arab life-styles" during the British Mandate period.

Actually, the two peoples rarely encountered one another in day-to-day life. As a result, she observed, an entire generation grew up living in close proximity to (and in some cases alongside) Arab communities, yet remained almost totally ignorant of Arab ways of life. Arabic and Arab culture were completely alien to them. Still, she points out, this generation was not filled with hatred toward the Arabs. Unlike their East European parents, they did not view the Arabs as another kind of non-Jew they had to suffer and put up with.... They did not think of them in terms of historical forces, anti-Jewish currents from the time of Pharaoh and Amalek to Haman, the Crusaders, Chmielnicki, and Petlyura. Rather, they saw these non-Jews in a Palestinian context, as a local problem with real, concrete, not mythical dimensions.(39)

Shapira is perhaps correct in arguing that Jewish society possessed no endemic hatred of Arabs. Nonetheless, the textbooks of the period were clearly filled with bias and stereotypical descriptions that led to the emergence and institutionalization of hostile attitudes toward the Arabs. "Savage," "sly," "cheat," "thief," "robber," "provocateurs" and "terrorists" were typical adjectives used by textbooks when describing Arabs. Adhering to a tradition of depicting Jewish history as an uninterrupted record of anti-Semitism and persecution, the cycles of violence between Jews and Arabs during the Mandate were dubbed "riots" and "pogroms," while the Palestinian Arab leader, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, was perceived as merely one in a long line of "oppressors" of Jews during the course of their history. Shapira correctly notes that the intensification of Arab-Jewish hostility and violence evoked a corresponding tendency to dehumanize the Arab enemy, which in turn served to legitimize the use of force against the Arabs.(40)

The establishment of a uniform national educational system in 1953 did not produce any significant changes in the narrative of the textbooks, which continued to depict Arabs in negative terms. Two main reasons account for this. First, textbooks originally published during the mandatory period were often reissued and used well after 1953; some were in use as late as the 1970s.

Second, most of the textbook authors had themselves taken part in, or at least lived through, the events they described, most particularly the War of Independence and the establishment of the State of Israel. In writing their books, they were almost instinctively aware of the "red lines" that under no circumstances could be crossed; they certainly did not need any special guidelines in this respect from the Ministry of Education. While from the 1950s onwards, the ministry reviewed the contents of all textbooks as part of an authorization procedure, in practice the authors applied a form of intuitive self-censorship. Any information that might have marred Israel's image or raised doubts about the Jewish fight to the land of Israel was instinctively omitted.

The historical narrative in this first generation of textbooks was simplistic, one-sided and often blatantly distorted. The writing style was emotional and laden with pathos. This is hardly surprising given that the textbooks were written by individuals intimately involved with and affected by the events they described. The textbooks also entrenched a number of historical "truths" -- later to be recognized as Zionist myths -- deemed essential to unite and consolidate the nation. One such myth, the depiction of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a battle of "the few against the many," was frequently exploited to prove how the Jews, as throughout their history, were a persecuted minority.

The first-generation textbooks mirrored Zionist historiography at the time. Much has been written on how this historiography was utilized to legitimize the Jewish claim to the land of Israel.(41) Less has been noted about the way the educational system exploited Zionist historiography to fashion its historical narrative. Influential historians such as Ben-Zion Dinur and Shmuel Ettinger constituted a direct link between Zionist historiography and school textbooks.

Most of the textbooks were based on books written by these historians, who themselves wrote several history textbooks. Not surprisingly, the historical narrative of the textbooks ended up as virtually identical to that in Zionist historiography. Both termed the cycles of violence between Arabs and Jews during the mandatory period merely "events" (me'ora'ot), thereby downplaying the Arab-Palestinian national movement. Expressions such as "bandits" (knufiyot) to describe the Arab-Palestinian forces; "mass butchery" (pra'ot) or "pogroms" to describe the killing of Jews by Arabs; and "flight" (brihah) or "departure" (azivah) to describe the fate of the 1948 refugees, were other biased terms common to both.

If the textbooks adopted and mirrored the key tenets of Zionist historiography, only selective use was made of Middle Eastern historiography. Since most of the textbook authors came from Eastern Europe or Germany, they were better acquainted with both European and Jewish history. Their images and associations, indeed their entire frame of reference, were firmly rooted in the history and culture of Europe.

They were not conversant with Middle Eastern customs and were unfamiliar with the region's traditions anti language. Consequently, even naturally, they associated Arab violence with the pogroms of Eastern Europe, and regarded the Arabs as a local version of the anti-Semitic goy.

Not all textbook authors and education officials, however, were ignorant of Middle Eastern historiography. Naftali Zon, head of the Department for High School Teaching in the Ministry of Education (1958-1972), was, as his personal papers reveal, well acquainted with Middle Eastern history.(42) Apparently, he based his lectures and written output in part on works by Yaakov Shimoni, an expert on the Middle East who served in the Foreign Ministry.(43) Yet, important information recorded in Shimoni's book did not find its way into the textbooks published under Zon's aegis. Seemingly, Middle Eastern historiography was acceptable only so long as it served the educational system's goals and did not challenge established Zionist "truths." Here too, authors used self-censorship. It cannot be said, therefore, that the first-generation textbooks reflected Middle Eastern historiography of the period.

The Middle Phase: "Adolescence" (1967-1984/85)

The 1967 war constituted a watershed in Israeli education, affecting the teaching of Zionism and Israel, on the one hand, and Arab history and Arabic, on the other. The changes in attitude in this context, which reflected changes in Israeli society at large, were a product of three developments: First, the conquest of the Arab territories, and especially the West Bank, brought the Arabs and the Palestinians closer -- geographically and psychologically -- to Israeli society. The image of the Arab became less anonymous and more concrete. Some Israelis genuinely wanted to learn more about their neighbors. One indication was the increase in the number of Arabic classes in the 1967/68 school year.(44)

The second development was the heated debate in Israeli society over the question of the legitimacy and desirability of Israeli occupation (especially over the West Bank). Those who thought that Israel had liberated, rather than conquered, the territories called for strengthening Jewish and Zionist identity by expanding the study of Jewish-Israeli history. Such study was perceived as a remedy to the doubts that existed in Israeli society regarding Jewish rights to the occupied territories. Third, Israeli society was exposed more than ever before to information in Hebrew about the Arab world, the PLO and the Palestinian national movement, both from the media and from the academic world. Particularly important were the studies of Middle East scholars Yehoshafat Harkabi and Yehoshua Porath of the Hebrew University.(45)

By 1969 a debate had emerged over the desirability of teaching the Arab-Israeli conflict in the educational system. The most thought-provoking discussions on the issue took place at a three-part conference organized that year by the Teachers' Union, with the participation of leading academics, education officials and teachers. It discussed the necessity of integrating the Arab-Israeli conflict into the high school curriculum. According to the organizers, the Ministry of Education "[had] yet to rouse itself and direct the teacher to include this subject in the curriculum."(46)

Harkabi, former head of military intelligence and a noted expert on Arab-Israeli relations, opened the conference by advocating that the Arab-Israeli conflict be taught in high school as an integrated element in various subjects. Pessimistic al)out the chances of solving the conflict politically, he thought that the only way to prepare the younger generation for a lasting struggle was by "equipping them with knowledge of the Arab point of view."

Harkabi emphasized the importance of "educating for truth," i.e. illuminating inconvenient facts that conflicted with the official line of thinking. At the same time, he recommended keeping the discussions "objective," by which he meant exposing the distortions in the Arab attitude toward Zionism and thereby strengthening the Zionist claim. This line of thinking suggests that Harkabi was an advocate of what I term the "immunization theory" -- the conviction that studying the Arab-Israeli conflict would "immunize" young people against the enemy. In reality, however, Harkabi's position was more sophisticated:

▪ The wisdom is in realizing that we are destined to live with a neighbor who is also an opponent, over a long period of time, and [therefore] we have to think beyond the present day. The wisdom is not to see the opponent as a culprit ... but to realize that there is no absolute justice ... and that each side has its own truth.(47)

His and other addresses elicited heated debate at the conference over the extent to which young people should be exposed to the complexities of the "truth." Two points of view emerged. The first, based on a pithy adage by labor ideologue Berl Katznelson, held that uncertainty is a natural human emotion that encourages open-mindedness. Understanding the enemy would not weaken the Israeli soldier, and familiarity with the language, culture and history of the Arab world would help to bridge the gulf between the embattled parties.48 The second viewpoint held that it was unwise to offer information that would give rise to guilt feelings toward the Arabs. Teaching the student to "understand the enemy" only served to "undermine the justice of our case and sap the strength of our soldiers when they go to war."

One participant, asserting that uncertainty would bring nothing but "weakness and despair," exclaimed: "How can I cultivate in my students a state of perpetual schizophrenia, a divided soul, the sense of being both right and wrong... the daily anguish of being both correct and incorrect!"(49)

The appointment of Yigal Allon as minister of education in 1969 strengthened Harkabi's school of thought. Allon sought to introduce Middle Eastern studies into the curriculum. In part, this was a reflection of his own strongly held humanist beliefs, and in part a hope that to do so would help ease Arab-Israeli relations.(50) Allon instructed the ministry to produce a textbook on the Arab-Israeli conflict, a task that involved a lengthy period of experimentation. The final version of the textbook was formally introduced in the 1978/79 school year, as part of the civics curriculum (and not in the history curriculum as initially planned). Unlike Allon, many educators were of the opinion that the aim of teaching the subject should be to fortify and immunize young people, thereby preparing them for future wars with the enemy. The foremost representative of this approach was the deputy education minister, Aharon Yadlin.(51)

Textbooks during this period were also guided by the long-standing belief that the educational system's primary responsibility was to instill Zionist values. Not only did this conviction still hold sway, it was reinforced after the traumatic 1973 war. Following the war, the Ministry of Education was blamed both for the youth's woeful ignorance of Israel's history and the general weakening of Zionist values.(52)

This period witnessed the publication of a new, second generation of textbooks. Written in accordance with a new history curriculum (1975), these textbooks were issued between the years 1975 and 1992. They were published under the direction of the Curriculum Center, established in 1966 as part of the reform of the educational system.

Both in format and design, and in methodological premises, the second-generation textbooks were radically different from their predecessors. There were also changes in terms of content, though of a less revolutionary nature. Both the Arabs and the Arab-Israeli conflict were described in a more balanced manner, and the historical narrative on the whole was less biased and contained fewer expressions that inspired negative stereotypes. Moreover, for the first time the Arabs were not treated as a single monolithic group but divided into separate peoples, including the Palestinian Arab people.

This development was due to the impact of Porath's study of Palestinian nationalism, which was partially incorporated into the textbooks (see above). Important changes also took place in the retelling of certain Zionist "truths." The myth that the first immigrants had found an "empty and desolate land" began to crumble. Less heroic interpretations of the last stand at Tel-Hai in 1920 were offered alongside the traditional myth.

New statistics were cited that contradicted the powerful 1948 "few against the many" myth. In addition, the complicated question of the identity of Israel's Arab citizens was presented in a more nuanced manner.(53)

Though demonstrably less skewed than their predecessors, the textbooks of the second generation were problematic in several areas. High school textbooks were overloaded with information, making it difficult for the student to see the forest for the trees. The new reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict exemplified this tendency: it was compiled on the assumption that the average high school student was capable of handling primary sources.

It soon became evident, however, that the student, as well as the teacher, was more comfortable with the traditional way of narrating history. Another factor that emerged was that it was virtually impossible to dissociate the history of the conflict from current political developments. Unable to teach it in a detached and neutral manner, teachers often preferred to abandon the subject altogether, as it was an optional and not a required component of the civics curriculum.

Additionally, as a result of the complexity of the ministry textbooks, privately written textbooks unapproved by the ministry made their way into the schools, used particularly in classes preparing students for matriculation in Jewish and Israeli history. These textbooks, which were prepared in accordance with the official history curriculum, often resembled the old textbooks ("first-generation") in narrative. Only in the mid-1990s was this trend arrested.

The second-generation textbooks, moreover, were not free of prejudice, although it was expressed in a more sophisticated, and therefore perhaps more dangerous, manner than in the past. If previously the text alone was used to convey erroneous facts, slanted accounts and biased opinions, now maps, pictures, caricatures and diagrams reinforced this information. Furthermore, sensitive issues, such as the refugee problem or the 1967 war, were treated in much the same way as before: Israel was absolved of all responsibility or blame. Equally problematic was the fact that the narrative in all history textbooks ended with the 1948 war.

Later events were only partially covered by civics textbooks, but this aspect was not a compulsory component of the curriculum. As a result, many of the key events in Israel's contemporary history were not taught in a systematic way. Additionally, the Arab world was discussed solely in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and from a Zionist standpoint. No effort was made to acquaint the student with Arab history and culture as such. In this respect, the second generation of textbooks mirrored the first.

No change came about in the Ministry of Education's policy toward the Arab question with the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in March 1979. The minister, Zevulun Hammer, of the National Religious Party (Mafdal), articulated a distrustful attitude toward the Arabs in an interview before the opening of the 1979/1980 school year:

The State of Israel has always striven for peace. We have never preached hatred among nations. If there is a need to modify textbooks ... it is the government of Egypt that will have to change the contents of its books. The textbooks used throughout our educational system are frequently and thoroughly examined, and to date no hostile expressions that could possibly offend the Arabs have come to light....

The peace agreement with Egypt indubitably means that we will have to strengthen ourselves morally and culturally. Time and again, I have warned of Arab leaders who are certain that if they cannot defeat us on the battlefield they will destroy us through a long and continuous process of assimilation! I am aware that there are those among them who, in their heart of hearts, hope that we will, as a result of peace, eventually become engulfed by a sea of millions of Arabs.(54)

This passage is illuminating because it clearly reflected existing perceptions within Israeli society. First, it articulated a conviction that "our" textbooks were impeccable and that it was only the Arab textbooks that required revision. Second, it expressed a deep suspicion of the Arabs which led some to discern a hidden motive behind Sadat's peace initiative. Since the Arab desire to eliminate the Jews from the region had not basically changed, this argument went, the peace treaty was merely a ploy to achieve the same old end. Lastly, Hammer reiterated the "immunization theory" dressed in a slightly different garb: peace with the Arabs threatened Israel's shaky identity, necessitating an effort to strengthen Jewish and Zionist consciousness.

The Transformative Period: "Adulthood" (1984 -- Present)

In the long run things did change. In February 1984, while Hammer was still in office, the director-general of the ministry published a directive specifying the guidelines of a new study entitled: "The Program on Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence." In many respects, it marked the educational system's passage from adolescence to maturity. The program was based on the perception that the need to deal with Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and relations with the Arab states was an "existential necessity." Ignoring these two issues, the guidelines stated, meant "educating the younger generation toward ignorance and alienation with regard to questions that would always stand at the very core of our existence." The term "conflict," it pointed out, was no longer appropriate for describing Jewish-Arab relations because some Arab states and groups had dealings with Israel (such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon and the Arabs of Israel), even though other Arab states were still in a state of war.

The program called for imparting the ability to maintain "intercultural contact on the basis of equality and respect for the other's culture." More concretely, it recommended teaching Arab history, language, literature and culture. These subjects were to be integrated into the entire educational process, from kindergarten to high school. In addition, it called for reviewing all existing curricula and textbooks with the aim of deleting wording fostering stereotypes and prejudice. The implementation of this program was to take three years. In the absence of the necessary infrastructure to accomplish this, the Jerusalem-based Van Leer Foundation was asked by the ministry to prepare curricula and textbooks on the subject.(55)

This formulation of the new program was precipitated by several developments, including the polarization of Israeli society following the 1982 Lebanon War, the appearance of extremist right-wing groups, such as Rabbi Kahana's "Kakh" movement, and the murder of a participant in a "Peace Now" protest demonstration in September 1983. These and other distressing displays of intolerance led the Ministry of Education to take a more involved stand on the question of Arab-Israeli relations. However, in September 1984, before the new program could be put into operation, Minister Zevulun Hammer was replaced by Yitzhak Navon, former president of Israel.

Upon assuming office, Navon's attention was drawn to a survey conducted by the Van Leer Foundation, which revealed that young Israelis harbored antidemocratic opinions, especially concerning foreigners and Arabs.so Alarmed, he announced that the annual theme of the 1985/86 and 1986/87 school years would be "Democracy and Democratic Values," with the aim of teaching students the value of a pluralistic society and instilling "tolerance toward others and especially toward minorities."(57) A special Unit for Democracy and Coexistence was set up by the ministry in 1986 to implement this program.

The pedagogic emphasis on democracy meant that the program for Arab-Israeli coexistence was put on the back burner, although the issue of Arab-Jewish relations was not neglected. The ministry's focus on democratic values and tolerance encouraged a more serious discussion of the status of Israel's Arab citizens as well. A textbook on this subject was gradually introduced into the civics syllabus in high schools in the late 1980s. Although it contained several defects, the textbook constituted an important landmark in the educational system's effort to confront the difficult question of the identity of the Arab citizens of Israel and their relationship with Jewish society.(58)

By the early 1990s, changes in Israeli society brought about further changes in textbooks. Their content was also influenced by the publication of controversial new studies in Zionist and Middle Eastern history. Based mostly on declassified Israeli archives, and dubbed "the new historiography," these' studies questioned well-established Zionist myths,(59)

In addition, the onset of the peace process in the early 1990s, and the hope that a solution could at last be found to the Arab-Israeli conflict transformed Israeli society's view of the "enemy." The result was a tendency toward greater open-mindedness, which served as a basis for the presentation of a more complex historical narrative that no longer ignored the shadows in Israeli history.

With the publication of new history curricula for junior and high schools in the mid-1990s and thereafter, new authorized textbooks were introduced into the school system. It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about these third-generation textbooks, although certain observations are in place. Methodologically, these textbooks are fundamentally different from their predecessors in that the artificial division between world, Jewish and Zionist history has been eliminated. Furthermore, the narrative does not end in 1948 but continues into the present.

Generally, the Arabs are no longer described in stereotypical terms. Indeed, on the whole, these textbooks seem to present a balanced picture of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even though it is still viewed primarily from a Zionist perspective, an attempt is made to understand the Arab point of view, especially in discussions of some of the sensitive issues in the history of the conflict. While none of the new textbooks is flawless, together they reveal the extent to which Israeli society and the educational system have progressed with respect to the way the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arabs have been portrayed in Jewish textbooks.(60)

This process is best illustrated by comparing the way each generation of textbooks discussed the refugee problem, possibly the most sensitive issue in Arab-Israeli relations.(61)

The Transformation of the Historical Narrative

Israel's role in and responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem during the 1948 war is one of the most controversial issues in the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, even in this respect, the Israeli historical narrative has undergone a considerable transformation, over the years.

Textbooks of the first generation presented a simplistic, unambiguous interpretation of the events. Israel, they asserted, had had no part in creating the refugee problem in the 1948 war. The local Arab population had been explicitly encouraged to flee the country by its own leaders. Most of the textbooks made no mention of the number of refugees, and where figures were cited, they were lower than those provided by the UN or by the Arabs.

The refugees were not identified as Palestinians; they were referred to as Arabs or simply as refugees. In describing the exodus of the population from the land, the textbooks euphemistically used the terms "left," "departed," "abandoned," "deserted" and "fled." Whether the Arab population had merely been obeying their leaders' orders or reacting to the pressures and terrors of war (e.g. the Dir Yasin massacre) was a moot point as far as these texts were concerned. According to a typical historical narrative:

The Arabs began fleeing the country's towns and villages several weeks before the official end of the British Mandate. The Arab population's spirit was broken and the result was a mass, panic-stricken flight. This process was accelerated by vicious, hate-filled Arab propaganda that struck terror in the hearts of its listeners and served to pour oil over troubled waters. The Arabs were deceived by their foolish leaders into believing that they would soon return home triumphantly, drive the Jews away and seize their property as the just fruits of war.(62)

The historical narrative of first-generation textbooks absolved Israel of all responsibility for the refugee problem; expressions such as "evacuation" or "expulsion" were rare.(63) Rather than expelling the Arabs, the argument went, Israel had actually sought to convince them to remain. In a civics textbook, Nathaniel Lorch, the official historian of the 1948 war, emphasized that though the Jews "bid their neighbors to stay" in all the areas they conquered, "the Arabs preferred to leave."

He also argued that "the natural sympathy for the refugees led people to blame Israel blindly and indiscriminately for their plight. As a consequence, little or no effort is made to inquire into the precise course of events, and Israel is wildly accused of both creating the problem and preventing its solution."(64) It would appear, moreover, that the authors of these textbooks were not entirely unhappy that the Arabs had fled their homes; indeed, a palpable sense of satisfaction emerges between the lines. Inasmuch as the event had occurred in tandem with the absorption by Israel of Jews from the Arab countries, the refugees were regarded as part of a "process of population exchange."(65) The historical narrative, then, had a dual purpose: to emphasize the moral superiority of Israel, and to divest it of all responsibility for solving the refugee problem.

In many respects, the historical narrative offered by textbooks of the second generation was similar to that of the first. These textbooks, too, blamed the Arab leadership for the plight of the refugees. The expressions used to describe the Arab departure were identical: "flight," "abandon," "exit," "desert," "vacate," and so on. A textbook for junior high students, for example, described how, following the conquest of Tiberias, "the local Arab population preferred to abandon the town rather than accept the authority of a Jewish government."

In Haifa, "the town's Arab leaders consulted with the Arab Higher Committee in Lebanon, which ordered them not to surrender but to evacuate the town instead. They were assured that the Arab invasion would begin shortly and that they would soon return [home] in triumph." Moreover, the author continued, "dreadful and frightening tales of `Zionist cruelty and brutality' were spread among the Arab population. These, together with the expectation that the Arab armies would soon liberate `the conquered lands,' precipitated the mass Arab flight." Thus, "Ramla and Lydda -- to name but two towns -- were emptied of most of their [Arab] inhabitants and the refugee problem [was] created."(66)

To strengthen this point, the textbooks presented excerpts from documents proving that Israel had not expelled, and in some cases had even encouraged, Arabs to stay. Arab (Palestinian) leaders were also quoted, condemning both the Arab states and their own leaders for the disaster that had befallen them.(67) It should be emphasized that independently published textbooks for high school, which were not authorized by the Ministry of Education but which were highly popular, contained a similar narrative.(68) In addition, the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict (1979) displayed "sanitized," innocuous pictures of Palestinian refugee camps that fell far short of reality.(69)

A careful reading of these textbooks, however, reveals that ultimately they did offer a more complex picture of the refugee problem.(70) One high school textbook noted that in some regions the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had "evacuated the local Arab population" in the course of battle, and "prevented their return once the fighting was over."

In order to offset the negative implications of this sentence, it was added that "during the Ten-Day Battles a special effort was made to prevent the Arab population from leaving the country, particularly in the regions of Lydda, Ramla and Nazareth."(71) A textbook geared to vocational high schools admitted that "the IDF forces did not prevent the Arab population from fleeing to neighboring countries and in many cases even encouraged them."(72) Moreover, the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict included an article by the distinguished Middle East historian Bernard Lewis, providing nuanced background to the Palestinian refugee problem:

Between 1947 and 1949, a large number of Arabs from the areas to be included in the State of Israel abandoned their homes. They became refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the neighboring Arab countries. According to the Israelis, the local population was advised by its own leaders to leave. They were told that if they remained they would hamstring the progress of the invading Arab armies. They were further promised that they would soon return home in the wake of the victorious Arab armies. And so the Arab population left.

The Arabs, by contrast, insist that the Israelis expelled the local Arab population. Both claims are at one and the same time both true and false. There is little doubt that some of the refugees were counseled by their leaders to abandon their homes; and that others, especially in the strategically vital corridor that lay between Jerusalem and the sea, were ordered to leave by the Israelis. The vast majority, however, like millions of refugees elsewhere, fled their home in the midst of the chaos and panic of war. It was merely one more unhappy instance of the massive and unfortunate movements of population that took place in the aftermath of the Second World War.(73)

Textbooks of the second generation also introduced, for the first time, extracts from the Haganah's "Plan D" (tohnit dalet), albeit omitting significant parts that could damage Israel's image.(74) Only one authorized textbook referred to the "cleansing of the Arab villages" and "the conquest of strategic vantage points and the occupation of Arab villages" in discussing Plan D.(75) Two further points emerge from a careful reading of these textbooks.

First, they dealt with the thorny question of the precise number of Arab Palestinian refugees by presenting the conflicting statistics (Israeli vs. Arab figures), without according priority to the Israeli minimalist estimate.(76) Second, for the first time, a textbook cited Benny Morris's study on the Palestinian refugee problem.(77) Although this textbook was unauthorized by the ministry, the fact that it used a controversial academic work that challenged traditional Zionist historiography showed that the classical Zionist narrative in school textbooks was being eroded.

In 1995, an authorized high school textbook still repeated some central features of the old narrative, stating that "the Arab inhabitants of the country began a massive flight," and that "600,000 Arab inhabitants were uprooted from their homes and villages and fled the country."(78)

The years 1998-1999, however, witnessed the publication of a new generation of textbooks, written according to a new history curriculum, which differ substantially from previous textbooks. The textbook for junior high does not elaborate on the issue but it states that "during the battles many of the country's Arabs were expelled. Some ran away before the arrival of the Jews to the village or to the Arab neighborhood in the city, and some were expelled by the occupying force." It also adds that "more than 600,000 Arabs were uprooted from their places in the country and were settled in refugee camps."(79)

The teacher's guide for this textbook is more explicit, instructing the teacher to emphasize that "in this war over the home and the land there were acts of expulsion by the victors. When the [Jewish] forces conquered the mixed cities and Arab villages, Arab Palestinians were expelled on more than one occasion. This is why the Arabs call this period al-nakba (the disaster or holocaust)."(80) Another junior high textbook explained that in certain areas, where good-neighborly relations existed between Jews and Arabs, there was an "explicit order not to expel Arabs," but "the expulsion of the Arab population of Lydda and Ramla was confirmed by the political leadership."(81) This depiction stands in sharp contrast to the narrative of the first- and second-generation textbooks.

The history textbooks for high school approved by the Ministry of Education do not present a uniform narrative. In fact, one textbook omits the subject altogether while another treats it in a superficial and biased way.(82)

The most extensive and comprehensive analysis of the refugee problem thus far appears in Eli Barnavi's new high school textbook.(83) In a discussion that spans over two pages, the text accurately mirrors the current state of academic knowledge and shows some empathy for the refugees' plight. While the author uses the familiar expressions "fled," "departed" and "abandoned," he also notes that at the end of the fighting, "in order to clear the area of hostile elements, approximately 10,000 villagers were expelled from their homes."

He disparages as myths both the Israeli assertion that the Arab leaders encouraged the Palestinians to flee and the Arab charge that the expulsion was part of a "Zionist plot." The Arab departure, he argues, was brought about by a combination of factors: the Arab elites' abdication of all responsibility and their abandonment of the local population, the raids and attacks carried out by Jewish forces (at Dir Yasin, for example), and the general chaos of war. He admits, however, that in some places there was "also a deliberate policy of expulsion." Moreover, though "no formal political decision was taken to expel the local Arab population, local commanders were clearly granted considerable freedom in this respect."

The author notes that Morris, in his book, cited 369 abandoned Arab villages "including 33 whose inhabitants were deliberately expelled by Jewish forces." Regarding the sum total of refugees, he puts their number at something between 600,000 and 700,000, an estimate that is accepted by many scholars. At the end of this passage, he assesses the refugee problem in the context of the larger conflict:

As the years passed, hatred, alienation, the desire for revenge and the hope of return, all exacerbated by Arab propaganda, fused the refugees into a single nation and transformed the refugee problem into an international problem. True, Israel emerged victorious from the war of survival forced upon it. But the Palestinian refugee problem was to poison its relations with the Arab world and the international community for over a generation.(84)

The author, moreover, does not attempt to conceal the wretched, poverty-stricken conditions of the Palestinian refugee camps. In contrast to previous textbooks that showed "sterile" photos of the camps, the author uses a realistic photo, illustrating that "the Palestinian problem has ripened in the poverty, inactivity and frustration that engulfed the refugees in their miserable camps."(85)

In parallel to the presentation of a complex narrative in the textbooks of the third generation, teachers were exposed to additional teaching aids that largely substantiated this narrative. For example, a 1997 issue of the History Teachers' Journal, published by the Ministry of Education, discussed the historiographic debate between the "old" and "new" historians.(86) By exposing the teacher to revisionist interpretations of the refugee problem, the Ministry of Education legitimized the validity of the debate, if not the thesis itself.

CONCLUSIONS

A comparative analysis of the Palestinian refugee problem as it is presented in Jewish history textbooks in Israel reveals that the narrative of these books has changed considerably over the last fifty years. It is noteworthy that there were no substantial differences in approach to the subject matter between the secular and the religious systems, since many of the same textbooks were used by both systems.

For most of the period under review, the historical narrative was replete with bias, prejudice, errors, misrepresentations and even deliberate omissions. Arabs were portrayed in stereotypical terms that in turn reinforced a distorted image in Israel society. These textbooks were designed to serve the goals of a newly emerging society. In this sense, their biased historical narrative can be explained in deterministic terms: the need to construct a collective memory and coalesce Israeli society, haunted by a sense of isolation and a siege mentality. The first seeds of change were visible in the second generation of textbooks that first appeared in the mid-1970s. This change reflected developments in Israeli society, which in turn led to the introduction of new history curricula. New interpretations of Zionist history also played a part in this transformation.

A more radical change, however, occurred toward the end of the 1990s, with the publication of the third-generation textbooks. Although the picture that emerges from the narrative of the new textbooks is not uniform, the contents of some of these books suggest that they no longer constitute a major device by the state to shape the nation's collective memory. The appearance of such textbooks and the fact that no one uniform narrative has been imposed from above attest to a more confident society willing to confront its past, with all its flaws.

At the same time, however, the fact that the old Zionist narrative is still found in some textbooks shows that their transformation has not yet been completed. Moreover, the recent heated public debate over the textbooks' depiction of the "few against the many" myth revealed that some elements in Israeli society still consider textbooks to be a major socialization instrument that should transmit a certain "approved knowledge."(87) The Ministry of Education's new policy -- to approve various narratives that can be freely chosen by the school or the teacher -- enables it to present itself as a pluralistic institution and to deflect criticism directed against the innovations in some of the third-generation textbooks.

The appearance of a new narrative in history textbooks -- of which the refugee problem is only one aspect -- is a positive phenomenon that may, in the long run, facilitate the reconciliation process between Israelis and Arabs. The argument that this narrative hardly represents a change is, in my view, flawed.(88) True, students should ideally receive a more comprehensive analysis of Arab-Israeli relations, as well as complementary information on Arab history and culture: Yet, since changes in textbooks are often the product of social and political developments, such changes may await the fourth generation of textbooks.

The fact that school textbooks were in the past prejudiced and thereby contributed to the escalation of the conflict failed to penetrate the consciousness of large sectors of Israeli society. In this respect, the historical narrative presented by the third-generation textbooks constitutes an important step forward. Its impact, however, will be limited if there is no corresponding change in Arab, and especially Palestinian, textbooks.

In historical and national terms, the Palestinians are currently in the same position that Israel was in fifty years ago. If Palestinian textbooks must go through the long, exhausting process undergone by Israeli textbooks, the prospects of a genuine and lasting Israeli-Palestinian conciliation may lie far off in the future.

----------------

NOTES

(1) For an exception to this generalization, see Hanna Schissler, "Perceptions of the Other and the Discovery of the Self," in Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, eds., Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany and the United States (Oxford, 1987), 26. My generalization certainly does apply to textbook research in Israel.
(2) Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New York, 1991), 3. Sec also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London, 1991), 201; Amos Funkenstein, "Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness," History & Memory 1, no. 1 (Spring/ Summer 1989): 8.
(3) This was written in relation to Zionist historiography, but I think it applies as well to history textbooks; see Baruch Kimmerling, "Academic History Caught in the Cross-Fire: The Case of Israeli-Jewish Historiography," History & Memory 7, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1995): 57.
(4) Nachman Ben-Yehuda, The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Myth-making in Israel (London, 1995), 273-74. See also in this connection, Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition (Chicago, 1995), 4; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, 1986), 206.
(5) On stereotypes, see Hanna Schissler, "Limitations and Priorities for International Social Studies Textbook Research," The International Journal of Social Education 4 (1989-1990): 86. Elsewhere, Schissler asserts that stereotypes protect the members of the group from "cognitive chaos"; sec Berghahn and Schissler, Perceptions of History, 14-15. On prejudice, see Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York, 1958), 6.
(6) Daniel Bar-Tal, "Delegitimization: The Extreme Case of Stereotyping and Prejudice," in idem et al., eds., Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions (New York, 1989), 170.
(7) Ibid., 172-73.
(8) Howard D. Mehlinger, "International Textbook Revision: Examples from the United States," Internationale Schulbuchforschung 7 (1985): 287. See also Michael W. Apple, Official Knowledge: Democratic Education in a Conservative Age (New York, 1993), 1-14, 44-63.
(9) Michael W. Apple, The Politics of the Textbook (London, 1991), 10; K. Wain, "Different Perspectives on Evaluating Textbooks," in H. Bourdillon, ed., History and Social Studies - Methodologies of Textbook Analysis (Amsterdam, 1990), 39. Bernard Lewis wrote in this connection: "Those who are in power control to a very large extent the presentation of the past, and seek to make sure that it is presented in such a way as to buttress and legitimize their own authority, and to affirm the rights and merits of the group which they lead.... This continuing thread can be traced from ancient inscriptions on rock faces through medieval annals, modern schoolbooks and textbooks ..."; see History - Remembered, Recovered, Invented (Princeton, 1975), 53.
(10) Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, International Textbook Research (Goteborg, 1990), 8.
(11) Philip G. Altbach, "Textbooks in Comparative Context," in R. Murray Thomas and Victor N. Kobayashi, eds., Educational Technology -- Its Creation, Development and Cross-Cultural Transfer (Oxford, 1987), 159.
(12) Based on research in England; see J. Slater, "Methodologies of Textbook Analysis," in A. Dickinson et al., eds., International Yearbook of History Education (London, 1995), 180. Another study, by R. Wade, shows that "students engage in textbook-related activities 70%-95% of the time they spend in classrooms"; see "Content Analysis of Social Studies Textbooks: A Review of Ten Years of Research," Theory and Research in Social Education 21 (1993): 232. See also Shevah Eden, "A Comparative Examination of History Textbooks in Israel and Germany," Kivunim (1986): 201 (in Hebrew).
(13) Apple, Official Knowledge, 61.
(14) David R. Olson, "On the Language and Authority of Textbooks," in Suzanne De Castell, Allan Luke and Carmen Luke, eds., Language, Authority and Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook (London, 1989), 241.
(15) E. Dean, P. Hartman and M. Katzen, History in Black and White: An Analysis of South African School History Textbooks (Paris, 1983), 102.
(16) Jene Brophy and Bruce Sledright, Teaching and Learning History (New York, 1997), 20.
(17) Berghahn and Schissler, Perceptions of History 1.
(18) Jacobmeyer, International Textbook Research, 4-5; Berghahn and Schissler, Perceptions of History 2; Dean, Hartman and Katzen, History in Black and White, 13.
(19) See, for example, Apple, Ideology and Criticism.
(20) Anita Shapira, New Jews, Old Jews (Tel Aviv, 1997); Yaakov Barnai, Historiography and Nationalism: Trends in the Study of Israel and the Jewish Community 634-1881 (Jerusalem, 1995); Yaffah Berlovitz, Inventing a Land, Inventing a People: The Literary and Cultural Infrastructure of the First Aliyah (Tel Aviv, 1996); Adir Cohen, The Ugly Face in the Mirror: The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Hebrew Children's Books (Tel Aviv, 1985) (all in Hebrew).
(21) The article is based on a more comprehensive study of the question of history, memory and Israeli textbooks. For a more detailed analysis and a more complete list of the books that formed the basis of this article, see Elie Podeh, The Reflection of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli History and Civics Textbooks, 1953-1995, Truman Institute, Peace Publications, no. 9 (Jerusalem, 1997) (in Hebrew). The author is completing a book in English, entitled The Silent Conflict: The Reflection of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Jewish History Textbooks (1948-2000).
(22) Sammy Smooha, "Jewish and Arab Ethnocentrism," in 1. Hofman ct al., eds., Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel (Bristol, IN, 1988), 175. See also David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagan, Enemies in Politics (Chicago, 1967), 19; Zvi Lam, War and Education (Tel Aviv, 1976), 29-38 (in Hebrew); Daniel Heradstveit, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Psychological Obstacles to Peace (Oslo, 1979), 21.
(23) Daniel Bar-Tal, "Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Cognitive Analysis," International Journal of Intercultural Relations 14 (1990): 12-13. On the definitions of these terms, see Bar-Tal et al., eds., Stereotyping and Prejudice; Allport, The Nature of Prejudice,' Frances Aboud, Children and Prejudice (London, 1988). See also Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Jerusalem, 1972), 113-19.
(24) Ruth Firer, Agents of Zionist Education (Tel Aviv, 1985); Reuven Bar-Gal, One Hundred Tears of Zionist Education: Moledet and Geography (Tel Aviv, 1993); Daniel Bar-Tal, The Arab Image in Textbook Readers (Tel Aviv, 1984); Daniel Bar-Tal and Shimon Zoltack, "The Arab Image and Arab-Jewish Relations as Reflected in the Textbook Readers," Megamot (1989); Daniel Bar-Tal, The Rocky Road toward Peace: Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict, the Israeli Case (Jerusalem, 1996) (all in Hebrew).
(25) Eyal Naveh, The Twentieth Century: History for the Ninth Grade (Tel Aviv, 1999), 157 (in Hebrew).
(26) See, for example, Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State (Berkeley, 1983), 170; Oz Almog, The Sabra - A Profile (Tel Aviv, 1997), 52-61 (in Hebrew).
(27) Mihael Hendel, "Teaching History," in A. E. Simon, ed., A Pedagogic Encyclopedia: The Basics of Education (Jerusalem, n.d.), 249; E. Livneh, "Nationalist Teaching," in ibid., 423; Mihael Hendel, Pathways of History (Tel Aviv, 1967), 129; Teaching History, Unit 2 (Tel Aviv: Open University, 1980), 1 (all in Hebrew). According to Bertrand Russell, the contradiction between these two schools of thought cannot be surmounted: On Education (London, 1942), 10.
(28) Mihael Vizinger (Ziv), "Improving the History Curriculum," in H. I. Ruth, ed., Educating the Citizen (Jerusalem, 1950), 116-19 (in Hebrew).
(29) Mihael Ziv, Teaching History in School: Methods and Trends (Tel Aviv, 1956), 1-7, 13-14 (in Hebrew).
(30) Ibid., 16.
(31) Ibid., 22.
(32) Zvi Adar, Teaching the Humanities in High School (Tel Aviv, 1965), 145 (in Hebrew).
(33) Hendel, Pathways of History, 149; idem, "On the Problem of Teaching Israeli History," Urim (1957): 39 (in Hebrew).
(34) Y. Paporish, "Teaching History in High School," Urim 33 (1948): 115 (in Hebrew).
(35) Yaacov Shavit, The Significance of the Past: Methods of Teaching History (Tel Aviv, 1985), 11-13 (in Hebrew).
(36) See the report on the conference in Hed ha-Hinukh 41 (1967): 12-15 (in Hebrew).
(37) Ben-Zion Dinur, minister of education during 1951-1955, was also a noted authority on Jewish affairs. He wrote several books on Jewish and Zionist history that were used as important sources by the authors of school textbooks. Dinur had at one time declared that "there has never been such a thing as a Palestinian people ... but if we Jews help it to evolve, it will eventually come into being." Quoted in Mordehai Cohen, ed., Chapters in the History of Israel: Supplementary Material, vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 1981), 414 (in Hebrew). The fact that history textbooks did not distinguish between Arabs and Palestinians, treating them as a single group, also contributed to the neglect of Arab-related issues in textbooks.
(38) See in this connection Daniel Bar-Tal and Dikla Antebi, "Siege Mentality in Israel," International Journal of Intercultural Relations 16 (1992): 251-75.
(39) Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948 (New York, 1992), 260-61.
(40) Ibid., 362.
(41) Barnai, Historiography.
(42) Zon's private papers are located in the Aviezer Yellin Archive of Jewish Education in Israel and the Diaspora, Tel Aviv University (hereafter AJEID).
(43) Yaakov Shimoni, The Arabs of Israel (Tel Aviv, 1947) (in Hebrew). This book, still in use, has gone through numerous editions since it was first published. Despite its title, it discusses various aspects of Arab history. In addition, it chronicles the national awakening of the Palestinian Arabs. This is especially impressive considering that the book was first published over 50 years ago.
(44) It should be noted that this was a short-lived development. By 1969-1970, the Ministry of Education and the Knesset Education Committee were probing ways to expand Arabic classes in elementary schools. See Ha'aretz, 15 Mar. 1970; Lamerhav, 23 Mar. 1970.
(45) Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Tel Aviv, 1968) and The Palestinian Charter and Its Significance (Jerusalem, 1974) (in Hebrew); Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929 (Tel Aviv, 1971) and From Riots to Rebellion: The Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1929-1939 (Tel Aviv, 1978) (both in Hebrew).
(46) The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Its Significance for Israeli Education, pamphlet no. 6 (Tel Aviv, 1970), 4 (in Hebrew). For a short summary of the proceedings, see "How Should the Arab-Israeli Conflict Be Reflected in High School Education?" Hed ha-Hinukh 43 (1969): 10-11 (in Hebrew). The first session took place on 15 Jan., the second on 13 Mar., and the third on 8 May 1969.
(47) The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 16. For the entire speech, see ibid., 6-20. See also "How Should the Arab-Israeli Conflict Be Reflected?" 10-11.
(48) The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 24-25, 38, 53.
(49) Ibid., 95; see also 31, 105-6.
(50) See speeches by the minister of education and the deputy minister of education, Knesset Protocols (Jerusalem, 1972), 5 (in Hebrew). See also reports in Yediot Abaronot, 6 and 13 Feb. 1970, and Ha'aretz, 9 Feb. 1970.
(51) Aharon Yadlin, Teaching Values (Jerusalem, 1971), 23-24, and "The Turning Point: The New School (Curricula," in Shevah Eden, ed., New School Curricula (Tel Aviv, 1971), 16 (both in Hebrew).
(52) See, for example, Cohen, Chapters in the History of Israel, 6-7.
(53) For more information, see Podeh, The Reflection of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 15-25.
(54) Interview with Zevulun Hammer, Yediot Aharonot, 31 Aug. 1979.
(55) For the text, see AJEID. Ministry of Education, Director-General Directive, 1 Feb. 1984. See also Rami Hochman, ed., Education for Coexistence between Jews and Arabs: Sources (Jerusalem, 1986), 3-7 (in Hebrew). The revolutionary nature of the program was not grasped at the time; the only mention it evoked in the press was a brief item in Davar, 20 Mar. 1984. Certain details had been leaked to the press earlier, see Ha'aretz, 13 Nov. 1983.
(56) Mina Tzemach and Ruth Zin, The Attitude of Israeli Youth toward Democratic Values (Jerusalem, 1984) (in Hebrew).
(57) AJEID, Ministry of Education, Director-General Circular, "Educating toward Democracy," May 1985 (in Hebrew).
(58) Podeh, `The Reflection of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 25.
(59) Particularly important was Benny Morris's book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge, 1987), which was published in Hebrew in 1991. For the controversy surrounding the "new historians," see Israeli Historiography Revisited, special issue, History & Memory 7, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1995).
(60) This section is based on Podeh, The Silent Conflict.
(61) See in this regard, Mordehai Bar-On, "A Fresh Look: Revision in the Historiography of the 1948 War and the Early Years of the Israeli State," Yahadut Zmanenu 6 (1990): 97 (in Hebrew).
(62) Y. Spivack and M. Avidar, The Jewish Nation in Its Homeland and in the Diaspora: From the Independence of the United States until the Establishment of the State of Israel, pt. 4 (Tel Aviv, 1960), 217-19. This textbook was used primarily in the religious schools. For other examples, see: B. Ahiya and M. Harpaz, The History of the Jewish Nation: For the Eighth Grade (Tel Aviv, 1959), 190-91; Shimshon Kirshenboim, The History of Israel, 1936-1951 (Tel Aviv, 1956), 167; idem, The History of Israel in the Last Few Centuries (Tel Aviv, 1974), 161-62; Eliezer Shmueli, Our Nation's History in the Modern Era, vol. 7 (Tel Aviv, 1958), 191; Y. Ron, The History of the Jewish Nation in Israel and the Diaspora: The Modern Era (Tel Aviv, 1967), 185 (all in Hebrew).
(63) For example, Shmueli wrote that in the course of Operation Nahshon "the range of hills overlooking the road was entirely cleared of bandits," and that during Operation Maccabi, "all the Arabs from the villages between Jerusalem and Sha'ar Hagai were expelled," see Shmueli, Our Nation's History 186.
(64) Nathaniel Lorch, "Israel in the International Arena," in Mihael Ziv, ed., The State of Israel and the Modern Day Jewish Communities ("Civil Studies") (Haifa, 1965), 50 (in Hebrew).
(65) Ibid., 50-51.
(66) Not on a Silver Platter: From a National Home to a Sovereign State, 1939-1949 (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1984), 145-46, 176 (in Hebrew).
(67) The Zionist Idea (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1985), 300-301 (in Hebrew). The accusations voiced by Arabs figures had a particularly powerful and convincing impact, not least because they were taken from a book written by a Middle East expert, Mihael Assaf, The History of the Arab Awakening and their Flight from the Land of Israel (Tel Aviv, 1967), 180-82, 336-37. Similar "proof" appeared in the experimental edition of The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Chapter in Civil Studies (Jerusalem, 1974), booklet no. 10, 8-10 (all in Hebrew).
(68) Moshe Lifshitz, The History of the Jewish Nation: The National Movement, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1985), 110; David Shahar, From the Diaspora to Independence: The History of the Jewish Nation in the Last Centuries (Rehovot, 1990), 229 (both in Hebrew).
(69) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1979), 135, 149; see also Appendix 1.
(70) My interpretation differs from the one offered by Ruth Firer and Sami Udwan in "I am a Hero, I am a Victim," Panim, no. 3 (Oct. 1997): 43-49 (in Hebrew); for a particularly tendentious description of Israeli textbooks, see 43-46.
(71) The Jewish National Movement and the Establishment of the State of Israel (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1978), 128-29 (in Hebrew) (my emphasis).
(72) Avigail Oren, The Jewish People, Eretz Israel and the State of Israel, 1919-1970, pt. 2 (Jerusalem, 1988), 230 (in Hebrew) (my emphasis).
(73) The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1979), 137. To see how Lewis's views can be easily distorted and misrepresented, see Firer and Udwan, "I am a Hero, I am a Victim," 45. It should be noted that the reader on the Arab-Israeli conflict was used only by high school students (principally those studying in secular high schools), and not for a compulsory course. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that most Israeli students did not actually read Lewis's article.
(74) In March 1948, following several military failures, the Haganah recognized the need for a strategic plan to defend the Jewish state in the event of an Arab invasion once the British finally evacuated the country. The result was Plan D, which called for a series of offensive operations to establish a Jewish territorial continuum from Metullah in the north to Revivim in the south. It stipulated that Arab villages -- principally those that could not be permanently controlled - were to be destroyed. The villages were to be encircled and searched for both weapons and irregular forces. In cases where opposition was encountered, the enemy forces were to be annihilated and the villagers expelled across the border. Plan D was put into operation much earlier than expected, as part of Operation Nahshon. One of its objectives was "to clear a whole area, permanently, of Arab villages and hostile or potentially hostile villagers." See Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 112; see also 62-65.
(75) Shahar, From Diaspora to Independence, 2:243-49. Another censored version of Plan D can be found in The Jewish National Movement, pt. 4, 336-38; The Zionist Idea, pt. 2,289; Not on a Silver Platter, 140-41; Lifshitz, The History of the Jewish Nation: The National Movement, 2:96.
(76) One high school textbook specified that according to Israeli sources the number of refugees was somewhere between 540,000 and 600,000, that the UN put the figure at 724,000, and that Arab figures were higher still. See The Zionist Idea, pt. 2,300. Morris admits that it is impossible to estimate the number of refugees precisely. He accepts the British estimate of 600,000-760,000 (The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 298).
(77) Shahar, From Diaspora to Independence, 2:313.
(78) Eyal Naveh, The Twentieth Century (Tel Aviv, 1995), 203-4 (in Hebrew). This narrative reiterated that of an earlier history textbook, Between War and Peace (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1986), 202-3 (in Hebrew).
(79) Naveh, The Twentieth Century: History for the Ninth Grade, 143, 146.
(80) Eyal Naveh, The Twentieth Century: Teacher's Guide (Tel Aviv, 1999), 108 (in Hebrew).
(81) Ktzi'a Tabibian, A Journey to the Past: The Twentieth Century, History for the Ninth Grade (Tel Aviv, 1999), 292 (in Hebrew).
(82) Shula Inbar, Resurrection and State in Israel and the Nations in Modern Times, 1945-1970 (Petah Tikvah, 2000) (in Hebrew). This textbook devotes many pages to the War of Independence (122-60), but does not relate to the Palestinian (described as "Israeli Arabs") refugee problem. It also presents Plan D in a censored way. The other textbook, Eliezer Domke, ed., The World and the Jews in Recent Generations, 1920-1970, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1999) (in Hebrew), presents the issue only superficially (244, 285). This is surprising since the first volume of this series contained a balanced presentation of Arab-Jewish relations.
(83) Eli Barnavi, The Twentieth Century: A History of the Israeli Nation in Recent Times: History for the Upper Grade (Tel Aviv, 1998), 194-95. A similar narrative appears in Eli Barnavi and Eyal Naveh, Modern Times: History for the Upper Grade, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1999), 238-39 (both in Hebrew).
(84) Barnavi, The Twentieth Century, 195; Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, 239.
(85) Barnavi, The Twentieth Century, 194. Interestingly, in Barnavi and Naveh, Modern Times, 2:239, a photo of deprived Jewish immigrants is placed opposite the photo of the Palestinian refugees, which may suggest a parallel between the fate of the Palestinians and the Jewish immigrants.
(86) The Israeli "historians' debate" first became known to the public through articles in Ha'aretz, 10 June and 1 July 1994. Excerpts from the debate appeared in the History Teachers Journal, no. 6 (1997): 39-46 (in Hebrew).
(87) Most of the debate was held in the Israeli daily, Ha'aretz. See, for example, Aharon Megged, 7, 14 Sept.; Ron Briman, 31 Aug.; Nimrod Aloni, 7 Sept., 12 Oct.; Yisrael Bar-Tal, 21 Oct.; Gidon Levi, 10 Oct.; Shlomo Zand, 16 Sept.; Elie Po&h, 15 Sept. 1999. The debate concentrated on Naveh's textbook, The Twentieth Century: History for the Ninth Grade, but in fact should be related to the whole new wave of history textbooks (the "third generation").
(88) See interview with Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "To Reveal Massacre and to Conceal the Policy," Mi-Tzad Sheni, no. 20 (Dec. 1999), 24-27 (in Hebrew).